## Academic Culture K

### 1NC Echo Chambers

#### “Echo chambers” and liberal smugness are a myth used to caricature academia and serve anti-intellectual goals

Hanlon 16 [(Aaron R. Hanlon, Assistant Professor of English at Colby College and advisor for Georgetown University’s MLA/Mellon Foundation “Connected Academics” project, ) The Myth of the Liberal “Echo Chamber” on Campus, New Republic 12-22-2016] AT

In a series of essays this year, New York Times columnist Nicholas Kristof has argued that liberals in academia—people like me—are intolerant of, and politically biased against, conservatives on campus. “Universities are the bedrock of progressive values, but the one kind of diversity that universities disregard is ideological and religious,” he wrote in “A Confession of Liberal Intolerance,” in May. “We’re fine with people who don’t look like us, as long as they think like us.” Later that month, in “The Liberal Blind Spot,” he took on critics of his earlier piece, writing, “Frankly, the torrent of scorn for conservative closed-mindedness confirmed my view that we on the left can be pretty closed-minded ourselves.” And this month, apropos of campus reactions to Donald Trump’s victory, Kristof warned his massive progressive audience about “The Dangers of Echo Chambers on Campus”: We liberals are adept at pointing out the hypocrisies of Trump, but we should also address our own hypocrisy in terrain we govern, such as most universities: Too often, we embrace diversity of all kinds except for ideological…. We want to be inclusive of people who don’t look like us—so long as they think like us. There are plenty of legitimate critiques of campus politics, and there’s certainly room for more ideological diversity on campus. But Kristof’s recurring argument has glaring, and potentially damaging, flaws. He has an untenably narrow view of campus life and politics, and worse, he reinforces the hyperbolic view of colleges and universities that the right uses to undermine the credibility of people speaking from academic and pedagogical expertise. By pretending to look inward at the flaws of progressivism, but in practice externalizing blame for the left’s failures by scapegoating academia, Kristof’s confessionals contribute to the enduring strain of anti-intellectualism in American politics. Like so many on the right—and some on the left, like New York magazine’s Jonathan Chait—Kristof generalizes about liberal intolerance on campus and cites extreme examples, such as Oberlin students’ protest of a local bakery accused (wrongly, it seems) of racial profiling. But as CUNY professor and campus activism historian Angus Johnston points out, “Kristof is focusing on a tiny number of unrepresentative colleges. The typical American college student today—the typical American student activist today—doesn’t attend a tiny, insular liberal arts college. The median American college student attends a public college, never lived in a dorm, isn’t studying liberal arts.” Of the 20.5 million students projected to enroll in college this past fall, 7.2 million were in two-year colleges. Private colleges—to say nothing of elite ones like Oberlin—enroll about 3.4 million students in total. Even at elite liberal arts colleges, there’s a lot more dialogue between liberals and conservatives than critics suggest. “After Donald Trump’s election, some universities echoed with primal howls,” Kristof wrote, in a pitch-perfect impersonation of National Review. “Faculty members canceled classes for weeping, terrified students who asked: How could this possibly be happening?” Kristof’s point was that liberals on campus had sheltered themselves from the real world, but this was not the case at Colby College, where I teach. I know a lot of our students and faculty were upset, but I didn’t witness students weeping in despair about the impending Trump presidency, or looking to censor views they don’t share. Yes, some professors canceled classes. But most didn’t. I taught my classes as usual and left my office door open for students looking to talk politics—of any persuasion. Like my colleagues, I wasn’t concerned only for students fearful of Trump, but also those who supported him and might now feel embattled. Indeed, in the weeks following the election, what little I had to say about it in class came with an explicit affirmation of my respect for all of our students, and my openness to political discussion of any kind. When students asked for my thoughts, I was honest, but I also made clear that, like them, I’m a political being with my own positions and values, and I don’t expect everyone to agree with me. Beyond the classroom, a campus-wide conversation was also taking place. A week after the election, faculty members and students from the College Republicans and College Democrats held a panel to consider the implications of the Trump presidency. Then progressive students began organizing a walkout and march in solidarity with those marginalized by Trump. Students had discussed their plans with the administration, faculty, and other students, and a bipartisan debate ensued about whether a walkout was the best way to protest, and what the protest would mean to different college groups and constituencies. When the march finally took place, students with pro-Trump apparel mingled with the protesters—and did so maturely, without incident, which can’t always be said for political protests in the “real world.” This is just one professor’s observations from one elite liberal campus, but there’s also plenty of evidence to disprove Kristof’s broader claims about a liberal “echo chamber” on campus. He repeatedly laments that only “about 10 percent of professors in the social sciences or the humanities are Republicans,” but a largely liberal faculty doesn’t guarantee a systematic liberal one-sidedness or indoctrination in the classroom. As my colleague Neil Gross, a leading sociologist of intellectual life who researches campus political bias, notes of humanities and social science faculty: The vast majority of professors focus on teaching students the subject matter of their fields as well as basic skills such as analytical reading, writing and critical thinking. If current events do come up in classroom discussions, the usual pattern is for professors to promote what they see as open conversation. Gross’s research findings appear to hold on the student end as well. A Harvard Institute of Politics study finds that 21 percent of Republican students nationwide report feeling uncomfortable sharing their political opinions on campus, compared with 8 percent of Democrats. As Gross observes, “if suppression of conservative voices were rampant we’d see a far larger share of collegiate Republicans concerned about their freedom of speech.” Since there’s little evidence that a left-leaning faculty means only left-leaning ideas are acceptable on campus, what about the effects of left-leaning students? According to the UCLA Higher Education Research Institute survey of incoming first-years, students are entering college with increasingly liberal views (as opposed to colleges “indoctrinating” students with liberal propaganda). One might assume that so many liberal faculty and liberal students would turn our nation’s youth into the worst caricature of the Oberlin protester. In fact, according to Pew Research Center data, those with a college degree are less likely than those without a college degree to support censoring offensive speech, and they’re more likely to support the idea that “people should be able to say offensive things publicly.” In other words, contra Kristof, college students are more likely to be tolerant of offensive speech or opposing viewpoints than those who haven’t had the benefit of a college education. There is no “ivory tower,” no meaningful separation between the campus and the “real world.” The percentage of college students who also work full-time jobs was almost 20 percent as of 2011, double what it was in 2005. Among community college students, 29 percent have household incomes under $20,000 per year, and more than 60 percent work more than 20 hours per week. Even at elite institutions that enroll more affluent students, the geographical, racial, and ethnic diversity of students and faculty is not separate from, but a contributing factor to, the ideological diversity Kristof wants to see. I’m a progressive English professor, but my family lives in rural Pennsylvania and I’m among the few of my kin who didn’t vote for Trump. I live in Maine, on the border of very liberal and very conservative congressional districts. The day after the election, a white man pulled up to my partner, a Vietnamese refugee, and yelled “go home!” in her face. My politics offered no protection. In both my job and my personal life, I couldn’t escape into an “echo chamber” even if I wanted to. Thus, when people like Kristof depict students and faculty with cartoonish simplicity, they ignore the fact that we all contain multitudes. Kristof’s portrayal of campus liberals is just another form of elitist stereotyping, the mirror image of assumptions that every Trump supporter is a narrow-minded racist. By burlesquing progressives in academia, Kristof is making a faux-populist gesture of the very sort that drives the Trump-era right in its contempt for teaching and learning. Trump and his supporters have no regard for knowledge or debate, and thrive on petty caricaturing of political opponents. The right has turned the learning process that is student activism, with all of its inevitable triumphs and miscues, into national news fodder that’s meant to mock and discredit academia, not to bolster freedom of speech or ideological diversity. In this era of virulent anti-intellectualism, we don’t need more caricatures of academic life, especially from the left. We need more public intellectuals, especially progressive ones like Kristof, to stand up for the value of higher education—because without it, our political echo chambers would become that much worse.

#### Turns the case – charges of liberal bias spur conservative attempts to neoliberalize and neutralize the university, gutting free speech and access to higher education

Williams 13 [(Jeffrey J. Williams, ) Is there a “liberal bias” in academia?, Salon 6-18-2013] AT

AT LEAST SINCE THE CULTURE WARS first flared in the late 1980s and early 1990s, we’ve been hearing about the “liberal bias” of professors. In books and op-eds by conservative pundits such as Roger Kimball, Dinesh D’Souza, and George Will (who asserted in 1991 that Lynne Cheney, then Director of the NEH, had a more important job than her husband, then Secretary of Defense), we heard the charges again and again: that the radicals of the ‘60s had ascended to positions of influence and power in our nation’s universities, and were busy indoctrinating our children with leftist social and cultural ideas. At the same time, American higher education was changing radically, but not in the way conservatives like Kimball, D’Souza, and Will worried about. Over the last four decades, universities have undergone pronounced changes in funding and orientation, turning toward progressively higher tuitions and private sources as public support shrank, toward commercialization of research and other aspects of the academic multiplex, and toward more corporate-style management. Whatever the bearing of academic discourse, these changes reflect what we might call the “neoliberal bias,” dispensing with the liberal policies of the post-World War II years, when higher education flourished under the auspices of strong state and federal support. The neoliberal mantra holds that the best inducement to human activity is competition, so public services should be privatized and put on a market basis; accordingly, higher education has morphed to “the corporate university,” “academic capitalism,” or, as I have dubbed it elsewhere, “the post-welfare state university.” Think of college student loan debt. It can seem, particularly in the wake of the Occupy movement, as if student debt is a new economic problem prompted by the financial crisis of 2007–08. But the current situation actually arose as a deliberate implementation of neoliberal policy in the 1980s. Before then, under the auspices of the post-World War II welfare state, culminating in Johnson’s Great Society, university tuitions were low, largely subsidized by public sources, and student loans, when taken, were relatively small. In 1982, the average federal student loan debt for a graduating senior was about $2,000 — not negligible, but a relatively modest amount (about $4,650 adjusted to 2012 dollars). By 1992, the average jumped to $9,000 ($14,500 in 2012 dollars), in 2002 to $19,000 ($24,050), and in 2012, by my estimate, to about $28,000. (That doesn’t include private loans, which have risen exponentially over the last decade.) This ascent resulted from the deregulation of loans begun in the Reagan era alongside the defunding of public entitlements. Rather than the cost of college being carried by the state — by our collective payment in taxes — it has been privatized, the cost borne by each individual. This has also created lucrative new financial markets, with high profits for Sallie Mae and other student loan holders. (Sallie Mae had been a governmental body but was privatized through the late 1990s, seeing strong profits since.) The precipitous rise in college student loan debt is neoliberalism in action. Other elements of the neoliberal bias in higher education include the push for research to bring in corporate funds or lead directly to commercial patents, the morphing of administration to a CEO class detached rather than arising from faculty, the casualization of a majority of faculty in part-time, adjunct, or term positions, and the pressure on students, working long hours as well as taking loans to pay tuition. Given these changes, there’s a strange disconnect between the rhetoric about liberal professors and the material reality of higher education. In his new book, Why Are Professors Liberal and Why Do Conservatives Care?, the sociologist Neil Gross tries to settle the debate over liberal bias in academia. Using data, interviews, and his own experimental test, he confirms that, yes, professors identify as liberal more often than they do conservative, but the asymmetry is not as extreme as rightwing critics claim, and it has relatively little effect on their teaching. Gross adduces that professors lean left more often than they lean right by about two to one. In data from 2006, about 9 percent identify as radical (meaning they call for the redistribution of wealth), 31 percent as progressive (less about wealth but keen on social and cultural issues), 14 percent as center-left, 19 percent as moderate, 4 percent as economic (but not cultural) conservative, and 23 percent as strongly conservative. However, Gross also finds, from a set of extensive interviews as well as data and previous sociological studies, that the radical left has declined over the past 30 years, and that professors’ politics don’t usually affect their teaching, with most professors declaring that they cultivate neutrality. In addition, Gross performed a slightly sneaky but intriguing experiment, sending dummy letters to graduate programs asking for information, in some noting that the prospective student had worked for the McCain campaign, in some the Obama campaign, and in some no mention of political leaning. From the responses, he detects no bias at all: most graduate programs are happy to take all applicants, regardless of party affiliation. He concludes that “the study should count as reasonably strong evidence that most [professors] work hard to keep their political feelings and opinions from interfering with their evaluations of academic personnel.” To explain why professors gravitate to the left, Gross turns to social psychology, speculating that the process works through self-selection, similar to the process that results in most nurses or elementary school teachers being women. If you are left-leaning, you are more likely to consider going to graduate school and becoming a professor — especially in the humanities and in social sciences like anthropology and sociology. (Engineering and business tend rightward.) This logic seems circular — the stereotype reproduces the stereotype — but its significance is to dispel the charge that people experience ideological indoctrination in college. Rather, most people develop their political orientation during adolescence, and then gravitate to a profession according to their predisposition. The liberal reputation of the professoriate stems from the late 19th and early 20th century, according to Gross, when the research university first emerged in the United States. Professors in the early American college customarily were ministers, but after the Civil War they increasingly became secular men of science and some were affiliated with progressivism. This new breed of scholar prompted the first occurrence, according to a Google Ngram search that Gross relies on, of the label “liberal professor,” creating “an enduring social characteristic” or “imprint” that continues today. Gross’s development of the concept of imprinting is his contribution to the sociology of professions, and he theorizes that we choose professions based on such imprints. There are a number of other professions that tack left, such as writers, artists, and social workers. (Medical doctors and clergy tend right — clergy by about two and one-half times more than ordinary Americans, so I’m waiting for the scandal to break in the news that clergy are trying to indoctrinate us politically.) But conservatives have used college professors, over any other profession, as emblems to discredit liberalism since its height in the 1950s. The last section of Why Are Professors Liberal examines this rather single-minded attention to faculty, and here Gross looks to the formation of the contemporary conservative movement, particularly to William F. Buckley Jr. and his 1955 founding of the National Review. Drawing on archival material, he shows how Buckley, himself “only sometimes populist,” deliberately tapped into populist rhetoric against cultural elites to forge “a strong collective identity” for conservatives. Gross aims to dispel the idea that the rightwing attack is a grand conspiracy, controlled by powerful puppet-masters; rather, if not exactly bottom-up, it arises from “mid-level moral entrepreneurs,” like Buckley or David Horowitz, who are invested “in a war of ideas.” ¤ The value of Gross’s book is, as I’ve suggested, to leaven overwrought charges about professors. It also develops several key sociological concepts, such as “imprinting,” in order to answer the more general question of how people select professions. It is a polished piece of work, leading us through the wilds of data and theory in a plainspoken style for a general audience — not a popular audience, but an educated one versed in the rudiments of academic fields who would be likely to care about such debates. Sometimes we call this kind of work a “crossover” book, although the crossover is usually to those in different academic fields rather than those who might read books on a bestseller list. It’s clear that the book is Gross’s bid to become a public commentator about intellectual matters and politics. Yet for all the book’s various insights, its blindness is to the actual conditions of higher education. It takes politics entirely as a matter of discourse and exemplifies the disconnect I mentioned above, between the purportedly liberal views of professors and the neoliberal policies and practices that, over the course of the last 40 years, have remade the institutions of higher education they inhabit. Gross seems to take professors’ political views at face value, but one might wonder whether those views are in fact a façade, abandoned when push comes to shove (for instance, during the graduate student strike at Yale, when many self-proclaimed leftist professors threw the union overboard and sided with the administration), or a form of false consciousness, in which academics misrecognize their true position (as many critics in the 1960s claimed of professors’ complicity with the war state). Another possibility is that the kind of liberalism that contemporary professors espouse — a liberalism that focuses largely on cultural diversity and sensitivity to racial, ethnic, gender, and sexual difference, and not so much on economic equality and the redistribution of wealth — goes hand-in-hand with neoliberal policies. In other words, professors tend to be what David Brooks calls “bourgeois bohemians,” adopting the culturally liberal attitudes of the counterculture while remaining comfortably bourgeois, if not economically conservative, themselves. The trend away from radical views in the academy over the past few decades would seem to support this explanation. Regardless of their views, the fundamental fact is that college professors are disappearing, and the kinds of positions they hold have dramatically altered over the past 40 years. The real issue, in other words, is not what political views professors express, or even their rights to express them, but how politics have reconstituted their jobs and careers. In 1970, the overwhelming majority of faculty had full-time professorial jobs, whereas now their labor has been largely casualized, with a stunning three-quarters holding impermanent positions (as a new American Association of University Professors study reports). Gross only mentions part-time faculty in passing (noting that they poll slightly less liberal than regular professors), and speaks about professors as if they constitute a fairly continuous cohort over time. Moreover, he does not take account of the fact that, rather than professors, the cohort now dominating higher education is administrators. According to Benjamin Ginsberg’s The Fall of the Faculty (2011), the proportion of administrative professionals in American colleges and universities has grown from roughly half that of faculty 40 years ago to a majority now. In short, professors no longer constitute the core of the university, as the classic image typically has it: they are more commonly service providers for-hire, with the central figures being the managers of the academic multiplex who assure the experience of the student consumer. The midcentury history of American higher education, I believe, provides a better account of the political reputation of professors. Gross underscores a direct line from the late 19th century, when professors became more secular, but while this might be one link in their evolution, it is surely a distant one. It’s also questionable how liberal “liberal professors” actually were during that period (a Google search for occurrences of the phrase hardly seems definitive to me). The much more substantial historical shift took place in the period after World War II, during the great expansion of American universities. A professor was a rare species of professional a century ago, only numbering about 24,000 in 1900 and 40,000 in 1920, about one-fifth the number of lawyers, but in the postwar era it became a common one, with over 300,000 by 1960 and 686,000 in 1980, about the same as lawyers. The postwar boom also changed the composition of the professoriate, opening it to a much wider demographic mix than in the early part of the century, when professors were typically WASPs hailing from the comfortable classes (there were few Jewish professors, for instance, before World War II). This suggests a better explanation for the right’s attention to professors: they represent the flourishing of postwar liberalism and the success of the new welfare state. Higher education was a form of social welfare that affected a wide swath of Americans and made the case for liberalism in a positive way, not just as a safety net in hard times but as a bridge to a better society, or at least a ladder to help one ascend the class structure. If there is a contemporary “imprint” of professors today, it more likely derives from their apotheosis in this period than it does from the post-Civil War era. The culture wars of the 1980s were a delayed reaction to the triumph of liberalism. The same conservatives who went after professors for “liberal bias” also sought to delegitimize the legacy of the postwar welfare state during the Reagan-Bush years. Gross largely elides both this postwar history and the ensuing culture wars, and I think it shows the chief limitation of his approach. The editor of the journal Sociological Theory, he gravitates toward the theoretical explanation of an imprint, which, once established, is an “enduring characteristic” if not Platonic idea, rather than paying attention to the contingent and uneven texture of history. (He also emphasizes theory in his first book, Richard Rorty: The Making of an American Philosopher, published by University of Chicago Press in 2008, which is an excellent and rich biography overladen with a theory of “self-concept,” not unrelated to his ideas in the new book on self-selection.) It creates a gap in this book (it is amazing to me that, in a book on “liberal bias,” there is no mention of D’Souza’s Illiberal Education [1991] or similar texts) that abridges the actual history of the contemporary American university. To me, it seems obvious that the recent spike of the phrase “liberal bias” is an echo of the culture wars, whereas Gross emphasizes it as a discrete event peaking in 2005 (from a LexisNexis search). This perhaps reflects a difference of generational as well as disciplinary perspective, but it is also related to his effort to distance his account from criticism that attributes attacks on liberal professors to a right-wing conspiracy. In his introduction, Gross recalls his chagrin, as an assistant professor at Harvard, at the 2005 controversy over Lawrence Summers, then president of Harvard, who raised the issue of whether men and women have different mathematical abilities, spurring calls for his removal and his subsequent resignation. This provided a catalyst for the spike in complaints about “liberal bias” in academia, and Gross fixes on it. Later, his research on Buckley is intended to debunk the idea of a conservative conspiracy; rather, the attacks appeared frankly in the pages of the National Review. However, while charges of liberal bias might not result from a Parallax View–style scenario, they do often come from a small and concerted ring of conservative foundations and think tanks. For instance, American Crossroads, founded by Karl Rove, is funded by a small contingent of the superrich and supplies unprecedented amounts of money to conservative Republican campaigns. Such organizations might not finally win an election, but they do tilt the table, and let’s not mistake their politics: they are plutocratic, not democratic.

#### The alternative is to analyze neoliberal bias in academia

Williams 13 [(Jeffrey J. Williams, ) Is there a “liberal bias” in academia?, Salon 6-18-2013] AT

By now, it feels as if the obsession with liberal bias in academia is a tired debate, occurring in an echo chamber. Gross tries to lend some reasonableness to the debate, with new data and analysis, but I don’t think he leaves the echo chamber, and he effectively splits the difference, finding the charges of bias to be exaggerated as well as charges of conspiracy to be overblown. I doubt this will either settle the debate or help improve the conditions of higher education. What we need instead, I think, is a study of neoliberal bias in the university, particularly since the rhetoric of neoliberalism has now become ubiquitous, the lingua franca of administrators and even many faculty. In the 1990s Bill Readings observed that the new rationale of the university was the amorphous, technocratic one of “excellence,” rather than the traditional ones of disciplinary reason or national culture. The incantation of “excellence” no longer has quite the same currency; the new neoliberal mantra includes the buzzwords “disruption,” “innovation,” and “choice.” Part of their force is that they seem self-evident goods: who would be against innovation or choice? But I think that they sidestep some of the crucial problems of higher education, especially regarding equality. According to all the statistical markers, college is subject to a steeper class divide than it was 40 years ago, and academic jobs show a sharper stratification. This violates the best hope of the American university. What good is innovation if it brings us a more inequitable world?

### 1NC Political Correctness

#### The construction of "political correctness" is an attempt to dismiss the legitimate concerns of oppressed groups – the impact is racism, sexism, and ableism

Serano 16 [Julia Serano Author of Whipping Girl (now in 2nd edition!), Outspoken (her latest book!), and Excluded: Making Feminist and Queer Movements More Inclusive. juliaserano.com. "Prejudice, 'Political Correctness,' and the Normalization of Donald Trump.” Medium.]

To put it another way, “political correctness” is not an ideology, nor is it a specific set of behaviors. It is simply a slur that people utter when they want to dismiss an expression of social justice activism that they do not like. One person’s “political correctness” is another person’s common decency or righteous activism. It is also crucial to note that, while many people resent activist attempts to change social norms, we are not the only ones engaged in such actions: Those who harbor prejudices are also constantly trying to assert and/or change social norms, albeit in the opposite direction. And yet, these latter attempts do not face similar scrutiny or smearing. If I promote gender-neutral restrooms or pronouns, I will be dismissed as being “politically correct,” whereas North Carolina Governor Pat McCrory (who championed HB2, the law that criminalizes trans people who use public restrooms) is never described as “politically correct” (even though he has clearly engaged in political attempts to enforce a social norm of his own creation). When college students in 2015 tried to protest and no-platform Germaine Greer (an extreme and outspoken transphobe) people called it political-correctness-run-amok, but conservative protesters who attempt to protest and no-platform transgender activists (as happened to me in 2004) are never dismissed as “politically correct.” This asymmetry, along with its vagueness and inconsistent usage, is why I detest the term “political correctness,” and why I think we should all stop using it. From my vantage point, there are bigots who are pushing for social norms that conform to their beliefs, and social justice activists who are pushing for social norms that conform to our beliefs. And the population at large will have varied opinions about whether any given social norm is worthy or unworthy, advantageous or disadvantageous.

#### The alternative is to acknowledge that political correctness is a concept that is an effective tool in identifying bigotry.

Croft 15. Adam. News Editor at The Branding Iron. “Why Being ‘PC’ Matters.” The Branding Iron. MCM.

These days the notion of “political correctness” carries a pretty negative connotation. Sixty-one percent of Americans believe America is becoming too politically correct, according to a poll from Rasmussen Reports, making political correctness less popular than the president, whose approval rating is just over 50 percent. On Facebook I routinely see posts claiming America is becoming too politically correct and comments railing against the fact that cultural mainstays of yesteryear have been abandoned for being offensive. People mourn the loss of the ‘Dukes of Hazzard’ while proudly referring to Caitlin Jenner as a man, all under the guise of “fighting politically correct nonsense.” A grown man on my Facebook feed defended his use of the slur “retard,” because he’s “always used that word.” Just this week one of our best writers was scorned for pointing out the overt racism in Pinedale’s Rendezvous celebration. People act as though being “PC” is an unnecessary annoyance that threatens their very way of life. They act as though it’s a disease spreading from liberal coastal states into their neat, conservative homes in landlocked vacuums. However, everyone so vehemently opposed to political correctness makes the same mistake when critiquing political correctness: they make it about themselves. You see, we as a society do not choose to remove certain words from our vernacular at random. A secret committee of liberal politicians doesn’t meet once a year and decide red-face pageants are racist just to stick it to the good people of Pinedale. In fact, we as a society remove language, symbols or practices from our societal discourse when groups identify those elements as offensive, or when they decide they don’t want to be identified by certain terminology anymore. Moreover, you do not have any say in whether or not those terms are offensive if you do not belong to the group those terms affect. At that point, you’re in a position of privilege. For example, the man on my Facebook feed that used the R-word had no right to defend that word’s use as he is not a member of the group that word affects. He comes from a background of privilege, as someone who has never dealt with the negative connotations of that term. He doesn’t know what it’s like to be bullied by the use of that word. Instead, he should have recognized he has no frame of reference when it comes to that term, and left it to disabled persons to determine whether or not it is appropriate. So, when you “take a stand” against political correctness by sharing a picture of a confederate flag, using the R-word or referring to transgender individuals by the wrong pronoun, you’re not fighting for your right to say whatever you want. That right will always be there. You’re just proving that you are inconsiderate of the wishes of subjugated groups to self-identify.

### A2 "Not Our PC"

#### Regardless of how the aff *intended* to use the term "political correctness," its history and current usage makes any instance of the term offensive. Their "no-link" argument is the equivalent of saying that they didn't mean to be racist by saying the n-word.

### A2 Safe Space Bad

#### This is a new link.

#### Doesn't apply